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The logic of violence in Roman 
civil  war 1 
 
by Carsten H. Lange 
 
A civil war has no real enemy in the traditional sense, or perhaps 
more precisely, one must be created.2 In civil war the enemy is a 
fellow citizen and personal animosities assume great significance. 
Dehumanising the enemy was and is a standard way of 
persuading people to kill their fellow citizens, and language is 
one of the sophisticated ways developed to overcome the 
instinctive human aversion to doing so.3 One example will 
suffice to illustrate this point. Cicero (Off. 3.107; cf. Gell. NA 
5.6.20-22) notoriously suggests that a pirate could not 
constitute a lawful enemy: nam pirata non est ex perduellium 
numero definitus, sed communis hostis omnium (‘For a pirate is 
not included in the number of lawful enemies, but is the 
common foe of all the world’). Therefore, an oath given to a 
pirate could be broken, in contrast to conventional warfare in 
which the enemy should be treated justly (Off. 1.31-41, where 
Cicero also draws a fascinating distinction between wars of 
survival and wars against rivals for power (38)). The common 
enemy of all mankind was not protected by the laws of men.4 
The example becomes interesting when we look at the civil war 
between the younger Caesar and Sextus Pompeius. For instance, 
none of this turns Sextus Pompeius into a pirate, but may 
                                                
1 I am very grateful to Richard Westall for his helpful suggestions and comments. 
Unless otherwise stated, all translations are those of the Loeb Classical Library, with 
minor corrections. 
2 See also Cornwell in this volume. 
3 Grossman 2009. Rüpke 1995, 229-31 is quite right to point out that, at least 
in principle, fighting is about winning, also adding duty (231-5). This unsurprisingly 
is also the case in civil war. Killing your enemies and accepting that you yourself 
might be killed is an integral part of warfare. 
4 cf. Gabrielsen 2013, 133. 
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certainly help to explain why the label was used.5 Sextus 
Pompeius was a regional dynast and a warlord (with no state 
authority), a leader of pirates and slaves according to the 
triumvirs. Terminological issues apart, recent years have seen an 
increasing interest in the civil war period of the late Republic, 
especially from the death of Caesar onwards, with Josiah 
Osgood (2006) and Kathryn Welch (2012) as noteworthy 
contributors. Osgood has admirably revealed the enormous 
impact of civil war on Roman society during the period after the 
murder of Caesar.6 The psychological legacy of the civil war 
period of the late Roman Republic was extreme and as a result 
generated a vast body of literature both by contemporaries and 
by authors who lived much later. 
There has also been a growing emphasis on civil wars within 
the political sciences, prompted by the increase in civil conflicts 
in the contemporary world.7 (Civil) war is a recurring and 
distinct form of human behaviour. The manner in which wars 
are fought changes, but not the nature of war itself.8 This notion 
of the recurring nature of warfare is not unchallenged, but 
certainly offers a promising avenue for historical studies on civil 
war. In the late Republic as well as during the later Roman 
                                                
5 Lange 2009, 33-8; Lange 2013, 81-2; Lange 2016, 115-21. 
6 2006; cf. 2014. On the civil war of the late Republic, see also Henderson 1998; 
Sumi 2005; Lange 2009; Breed, Damon, and Rossi 2010. On the impact of civil war, 
see now also Zimmermann 2013, esp. 281-92; Börm, Mattheis, and Wienand 2015. 
7 cf. Levy and Thompson 2010, 186-204. 
8 Howard 1962, 6 concludes: ‘Given all these academic hesitations, war is 
nonetheless a distinct and repetitive form of human behaviour’; cf. Strachan 2013, 
esp. 203, who, however, also emphasises that each war has its own characteristics and 
as a result one war often cannot teach us about the next. For a critical view of the role 
of comparative studies in ancient history, comparing ancient Greece and Rome with 
other historical periods or other cultures and societies, see now Vlassopoulos 2014. 
Surprisingly, however, he does not consider warfare. Armitage’s 2017 study on civil 
war from Roman times onwards, including contemporary conflicts, goes a long way in 
re-addressing some of these issues of why civil war appears to be a recurring part of 
human behaviour. Murray and Sinnreich 2006; Guldi and Armitage 2014, 20-1 view 
military history as an outpost for long-term history. See Black 2004; Morillo 2013 on 
military history and current trends. 
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Empire, civil war was the dominant form of war.9 It has been a 
constant occurrence in Europe ever since, and these civil wars all 
include factional conflicts.10 During the late Republic, these 
factional conflicts were confused by the frequent shifting of 
alliances, the always pertinent issue of legitimacy, and the fact 
that the different factions had at their disposal ‘regular’ legions, 
whether legitimate or quasi-legitimate. In a well-known passage, 
Cassius Dio describes dynasteiai (52.1.1): ‘Such were the 
achievements of the Romans and such their suffering under the 
kingship (ἔν τε τῇ βασιλείᾳ), under the Republic (δηµοκρατίᾳ), 
and under the dominion of a few [dynasteiai], during a period of 
seven hundred and twenty-five years’.11 Another constant in civil 
war is violence upon a large scale and of more than a sporadic 
manifestation over time. This contribution therefore proposes to 
use contemporary approaches to civil war, supported by 
empirical evidence, in order to reconsider the nature and 
character of ancient civil war, focusing specifically on violence in 
Rome and Italy during the Late Republic. 
The standard modern book on the subject of violence in 
civil war is Stathis Kalyvas’ The Logic of Violence in Civil War 
(2006).12 He challenges the conventional view of violence in 
civil wars as something irrational: it is generally not driven by 
the conflict itself, but by previous disputes and hostilities among 
the population and participants. His argument echoes that of 
Thucydides (see below). According to Kalyvas, civil war has two 
distinct features that set it apart from interstate conflicts, both 
fundamentally linked to violence: barbarism and intimacy.13 
                                                
9 Shaw 2001 on the later Roman Empire. 
10 Kalyvas 2006, 18-9. 
11 For this construct [dynasteiai], based on the differences between Dio’s 
Republican and late republican narratives, see Kemezis 2014, 90-149. Dynasteiai 
begins at some point during the second century BCE, where Dio’s books are 
fragmented, and ends with Actium: Kemezis 2014, 102; 107, n. 36 with scholarship 
on dynasteiai. For Appian, see Kemezis 2014, 108, n. 37 (B Civ. 1.pr.2). 
12 Kalyvas uses empirical evidence from the Greek civil war, focusing mainly on 
the Argolid region from 1943 to 1949. 
13 2006, 11. 
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Astonishingly, there is a tendency to overlook the high amount 
of violence in civil wars. One reason for the tendency to 
underestimate such violence may be that it often does not take 
place on the battlefield (I have chosen to focus upon two scenes 
that are not battlefield scenes proper for this very reason), and in 
some conflicts there is no clearly demarcated front line. Thus, 
much violence in civil wars is unrecorded, with a primary focus 
on pitched battles. 
Fighting neighbours and opposing warring groups with 
small armies was an integral part of the late republican civil war 
period and should not be overlooked.14 The so-called Laudatio 
Turiae explores the situation in Rome and Italy at the beginning 
of the civil war between Pompeius and Caesar. Many prepared 
to leave Italy to fight, but those left behind still potentially faced 
intimidation, violence, robbery, and murder. The husband who 
erected the inscription even proudly records that his wife 
defended their house (2.11a). This reveals that civil war was 
fought on more than just battlefields.15 Fascinatingly, the 
laudatio more than anything suggests that the civil war of the 
period should be viewed as one continuous war, not a series of 
civil wars.16 Violence was an integral part of the civil war of the 
late Republic, and Rome may even be described as a failed 
state.17 More than anything the civil war itself points to Rome as 
a failing state. The very fact of civil war also means that Rome as 
a sovereign state did not monopolise violence. The problems 
                                                
14 Osgood 2014, 16; armed gangs roamed the countryside: see Brunt 1971a, 
551-7 (‘Violence in the Italian Countryside’), with the ancient evidence. 
15 Conspiracies and civil unrest are other examples; part of the growing political 
violence in Rome and Italy during the late Republic. 
16 In fact, there is only one direct mention of civil war in the surviving text, in 
connection with Milo (2.10a). Civil war is thus mentioned fewer times than in the Res 
Gestae of Augustus (chapters 3.1, 34.1). 
17 There are, however, some problems in the idea that Rome imploded/failed as a 
state during the late Republic, as the different factions fought for supremacy of the 
state, not in order to dissolve it. However, the ties between the commander and his 
troops may still point in this direction. Different (failed) military coups certainly 
played a large part in the crisis of the Republic (the coup d’état of the younger Caesar, 
legitimised in RGDA 1.1; see Lange 2009, esp. 15). 
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inherent in the system have been masterfully described by 
Michael Crawford as one of ‘alternative states’ (2008). These 
‘alternative states’ – mostly in the provinces, including Sertorius 
in Spain in the 70s, Pompeius in the East in the 60s, and Caesar 
in Gaul in the 50s BCE – incorporated alternative career 
structures and local manpower resources that drew on Roman 
and Italian settlements abroad.18 Many players during the late 
republican civil war were not, however, Crawford’s ‘alternative 
states’, but they were certainly factions. Furthermore, Caesar, 
Pompeius and their elite associates always wanted to use what 
they had acquired in their ‘alternative states’ to advance their 
careers on their return to Rome. The civil war broke out in 49 
BCE not because Caesar did not want to leave Gaul but over the 
terms on which he would return to Rome. Sextus Pompeius’, 
however, was the head of an ‘alternative state’. 
In reacting to these ‘alternative states’ or factions, there 
certainly were demands for disarming non-state actors. Whether 
these dynasts had state backing and legitimate authority or not, 
their factions played a large part in the continuous civil war of 
the Late Republic. However, in these cases, including that of 
Sextus Pompeius, the various combatting groups were led by 
ranking nobles. Andrew Lintott in the classic study Violence in 
Republican Rome takes the view that Rome was inherently 
violent, and initial critique of his book suggested that he 
overstressed civil violence.19 If anything, I would suggest that he 
underestimated civil violence and that scholars often 
underestimate the violence perpetrated during civil war.20 
Importantly, civil war was much more than just the pitched 
battles of Pharsalus and Philippi. 
According to Kalyvas, political violence is often thought to 
be impersonal, public, and collective, whereas criminal violence 
is personal, private, and intimate. Civil war resembles the latter 
                                                
18 2008, 636. 
19 Lintott 19992, xiv: ‘… the Romans were living then in a society where violence 
was commonplace’; xix. Cf. Brunt 1966; Nippel 1995, on late republican violence. 
20 See, however, Alston 2015. 
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and is often intimate and private. It is a paradox that selective 
violence in civil war is similar to criminal violence.21 The 
question arises as to why there is a widespread use of 
indiscriminate violence in civil war. According to Kalyvas, such 
violence serves to achieve potential objectives: ‘extermination’, 
‘displacing people’, ‘plunder’, and ‘demonstrating a group’s 
power and ability to hurt another group’.22 He adds that, 
typically, indiscriminate violence is most effective when there is 
a great imbalance of power between the actors. Political actors 
are likely to move gradually from indiscriminate violence to 
selective violence, as the former may be counterproductive.23 
This suggests that the greater power actors possess, the less likely 
they are to resort to violence and vice versa.24 Another vital 
conclusion to be drawn from civil war studies is that ‘Civil war 
transforms often trivial and petty conflicts and grievances into 
lethal violence’.25 Intimacy is thus essential rather than 
accidental to civil war, and is often driven by local long-standing 
disputes.26 The rationale of violence in civil war should not be 
reduced to madness.27 Violence can in fact even be used to create 
order, maintain it, and uphold it in the face of danger. Scholars 
of political, social, and economic institutions often assume that 
violence is absent and order established, never considering that 
the maintenance of such institutions might be connected to the 
management of conflict and threat of violence.28  
This contribution seeks to comprehend and situate the 
violence of the civil war of the Late Republic, rather than merely 
                                                
21 2006, esp. 330-2, cf. 330-63 on intimacy and civil war. 
22 2006, 147. 
23 2006, 168-9. 
24  2006, 204. 
25  2006, 351; cf. 389. 
26 2006, 330; 362. Martin 2014 shows how difficult it can be to define the 
enemy in a civil war, focusing on the local character of the conflict, with Helmand, 
Afghanistan, as the case study. The conflict is too often erroneously characterised as 
Taliban insurgent violence. Outsiders do not understand the local conflict, and 
therefore they are themselves manipulated. 
27 2006, 388. 
28 Kalyvas, Shapiro, & Masoud 2008, 1. 
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noting its existence. It will suggest that behaviour during the 
Roman civil wars was typical of comparable conflicts, at the 
same time focusing on different forms of violence, 
indiscriminate as well as selective.29 Consequently, this 
contribution will re-address two instances of violence during the 
civil war of the outgoing Republic: the murder of Cicero during 
the proscriptions in late 43 BCE and the use of violence by the 
victorious younger Caesar upon the fall of Perusia early in 40 
BCE. They were, it will be argued, personally motivated, the 
latter being indiscriminate (Perusia) and the former selective 
(Cicero and the proscriptions). This does not suggest a gradual 
move from indiscriminate violence to selective violence during 
the period, but rather a shift in power and control amongst the 
protagonists. However, before turning to the Late Republic 
itself, a brief survey of the most famous ancient description of 
civil war may offer insight to the approach adopted here.  
 
Thucydides and Greek  s tasis30 
Thucydides famously describes the impact of the civil war at 
Corcyra in 427 BCE, a relatively minor theatre of operations 
during the Peloponnesian War,31 and in so doing he furnishes a 
substantial excursus on the concepts of stasis and civil war.32 
Geoffrey Hawthorn explains: ‘He [Thucydides] explains the 
                                                
29 This is supported by Zimmermann 2013. He emphasises that military might is 
exemplified by violence and terror (278). In order to present an ideology, the enemy 
must be portrayed as defeated, and instances of this must be presented to shocking 
effect (25). 
30 According to Loraux 1991, 49, each polis tended to describe their own internal 
divisions as diaphora, as opposed to the civil wars of their neighbors, called stasis. For a 
refreshing view of Thucydides and his work, see Hawthorn 2014 – Professor Emeritus 
of international politics and identifying himself as a realist, like Thucydides – 
suggesting that it is impossible to assign an ideology to Thucydides (15), and adding 
that he resists ‘illusion and obtrusively conclusive judgment’ (238).  
31 See esp. Thuc. 3.81-5; 3.81-2: ‘stasis model’, see Price 2001, 6-78. For stasis in 
the sense of factional rivalry, see Price 2001, 31; cf. Pl. Resp. 5.470d; in late 
Republican Rome a factio was associated with oligarchy (e.g. RGDA 1.1; Sall. Iug. 
31.15; Caes. B Civ. 1.22.5; B Gall. 6.11.2; Cic. Brut. 44.164; Att. 7.9.4; Rep. 1.44). 
32 Price 2001, 12. Most other instances of civil strife/war are mentioned only 
briefly (e.g. Thuc. 3.34; 4.1.3; 5.4.3; 5.5.1). 
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genesis and nature of one to convey the character of them all.’33 
Thucydides offers this detailed description, as this was only the 
first of many civil wars to follow (3.81.4-5; cf. 3.82.1: wars to 
follow): 
 
ἡµέρας τε ἑπτά, ἃς ἀφικόµενος ὁ Εὐρυµέδων ταῖς ἑξήκοντα 
ναυσὶ παρέµεινε, Κερκυραῖοι σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς 
δοκοῦντας εἶναι ἐφόνευον, τὴν µὲν αἰτίαν ἐπιφέροντες τοῖς τὸν 
δῆµον καταλύουσιν, ἀπέθανον δέ τινες καὶ ἰδίας ἔχθρας ἕνεκα, 
καὶ ἄλλοι χρηµάτων σφίσιν ὀφειλοµένων ὑπὸ τῶν λαβόντων. 
πᾶσά τε ἰδέα κατέστη θανάτου, καὶ οἷον φιλεῖ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ 
γίγνεσθαι, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ ξυνέβη καὶ ἔτι περαιτέρω. καὶ γὰρ πατὴρ 
παῖδα ἀπέκτεινε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν ἀπεσπῶντο καὶ πρὸς αὐτοῖς 
ἐκτείνοντο, οἱ δέ τινες καὶ περιοικοδοµηθέντες ἐν τοῦ Διονύσου 
τῷ ἱερῷ ἀπέθανον. 
 
During the seven days that Eurymedon stayed with his sixty ships, 
the Corcyraeans were engaged in butchering those of their fellow-
citizens whom they regarded as their enemies: and although the 
crime imputed was that of attempting to put down the democracy, 
some were slain also from private hatred, others by their debtors 
because of the money owed to them. Death thus raged in every 
shape; and, as usually happens at such times, there was no length to 
which violence did not go; sons were killed by their fathers, and 
supplicants dragged from the altar or slain upon it; while some were 
even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and died there. (trans. 
Strassler 1996). 
 
Thucydides emphasises that stasis has a dynamic of its own.34 
Wickedness and personal animosities reflect human nature 
(3.82.2; 82.1: at times of peace people did not have to do what 
they did not wish). Price fittingly concludes that ‘internal war is 
a state of mind’.35 At the outset this appears to be a civil war 
between two warring groups (oligarchs and democrats, pro-
Spartan and pro-Athenian). However, there is an added and 
                                                
33 2014, 96. 
34 Although Lendon 2010, 211, rightly suggests that Thucydides overestimates 
foreign war as the cause of civil war. Contra Sallust, who emphasised that the absence 
of war caused a lust for money and power, thus encouraging civil war (Sall. Cat. 10.4). 
35 2001, 30. 
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personal side to this conflict, something well known in civil 
wars.36 At 3.82.8 we are told that neutrality was impossible; 
people who maintained it were destroyed by either warring 
group. Another consequence was that ever greater excesses seem 
to have been a part of stasis – war changed men and made them 
capable of things that usually would not occur to them 
(3.82.3).37 Similarly, a permanent peaceful settlement was 
considered hopeless and thus the warring parties sought to 
prevent being injured themselves (3.83.2). Parallel ancient 
evidence apart (Tac. Hist. 2.38 emphasises the greed for power), 
with Thucydides and Kalyvas we can safely assume that these 
were regular features in civil wars in Greece and Rome, as well as 
their modern counterparts (Kalyvas: ‘violence in civil war often 
displays some critical recurring elements’).38 The political and 
moral collapse at Corcyra, as described by Thucydides, caused a 
brutalisation of the polis. This is also visible in Roman civil wars, 
to which we now must turn.  
 
Cicero’s body 
The proscriptions of 43-42 BCE singled out individuals as 
outlaws who could be killed with impunity and their property 
confiscated.39 There is no doubt that the Triumvirate was 
profoundly marked by violence, illegality, and arbitrary exercise 
of power, but all the same a justification was offered. There was 
in fact continual constitutional debate throughout the civil war 
period. The fullest descriptions of the proscriptions are found in 
Appian (B Civ. 4.8-11: proscription edict) and Cassius Dio 
(47.1-19; 47.13.3-4: the triumvirs stated they had emulated 
neither the cruelty (ὡµότης) of Marius and Sulla, nor the 
mildness (ἐπιείκεια) of Caesar).40 Cassius Dio emphasises that 
                                                
36 Cf. Kalyvas 2006; Martin 2014 on modern (civil) wars. 
37 Price 2001, 25. 
38 2006, 6; cf. Kagan 2009, 13. 
39 On the proscriptions, see Syme 1939, 187-201; Hinard 1985; Gowing 1992a, 
247-69; Henderson 1998, 11-36: ‘triumviral terrorism’ (15). 
40 See Gowing 1992a, 247-69, with further evidence. The number of dead: 
Brunt 1971a, 111-2, 301-2, 326. 
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the triumvirs agreed to ‘bring about the murder of their personal 
enemies’ (46.56.1: προσσυνέθεντο τῶν τε ἐχθρῶν σφῶν 
σφαγὰς ποιήσασθαι).41 This manifested itself at the outset in 
the form of personal vendettas, and Cassius Dio talks of the 
personal goals of the triumvirs (47.1.1; App. B Civ. 4.5 suggests 
that they compiled the list together). However, at 47.7.1, 
Cassius Dio places the principal blame on Antonius and 
Lepidus.42 There is little reason to assume that Cassius Dio is 
correct, and it seems much more probable that the triumvirs 
agreed on the matter. The story that the younger Caesar wanted 
to save Cicero certainly seems dubious.43 Significantly, these 
debates amongst the triumvirs, as recorded in our evidence, 
whether fictional or real, turn the proscriptions into something 
very personal. In fact, as can be seen from experiences such as 
those of ‘Turia’ and her husband, the debates and decisions 
made were as much about wealth and prestige as politics. 
Cicero was killed on 7 December 43 BCE, as a result of the 
proscription edict.44 According to some sources, the head and 
hands of Cicero were put on show on the Rostra (Sen. Suas. 
6.17). Florus offers a very colourful description (2.16.5):  
 
nam Romae capita caesorum proponere in rostris iam usitatum erat; 
verum sic quoque civitas lacrimas tenere non potuit, cum recisum 
                                                
41 Cf. App. B Civ. 4.3; Plut. Ant. 19.2-3; Livy Per. 120. According to Gowing 
1992a, 249, cf. 265, Appian is close to Thuc. 3.81.4. App. B Civ. 4.1.2 points back to 
Greek civil wars. See above. 
42 Cf. Vell. Pat. 2.66.1; Osgood 2014, 56, 124: in the so-called Laudatio Turiae 
the husband was eventually restored as citizen of Rome due to the clemency of the 
younger Caesar. This, however, required the consent of Lepidus, who at least at first 
refused to give it. The wife was even dramatically beaten at the tribunal of Lepidus, 
and was forced to go down on her knees before him (2.15-18). Even so, she 
persevered. Osgood is rightly sceptical on this matter (56), as this may be a question 
of discrediting Lepidus, but we cannot be certain that this did not happen precisely as 
the husband claims. Cassius Dio (48.3, see below) suggests that that the return of the 
younger Caesar to Italy was feared (so Gowing 1992b, 286). 
43 Plut. Cic. 46; Suet. Aug. 27 even suggests that the younger Caesar had been 
against the proscriptions altogether. 
44 The last days of Cicero: Livy’s account is preserved in Sen. Suas. 6.17; see 
6.14-27 for other accounts; cf. Vell. Pat. 2.66; Plut. Cic. 48-49; App. B Civ. 4.19-20; 
Cass. Dio 47.8.3-4–11.1-2. 
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Ciceronis caput in illis suis rostris videret, nec aliter ad videndum 
eum, quam solebat ad audiendum, concurreretur. 
 
It had already become customary to expose on the Rostra at Rome 
the heads of those who had been executed; but, even so, the citizens 
could not restrain their tears when they saw the severed head of 
Cicero on those very Rostra which he had made his own, and men 
rushed to gaze upon him as once they were wont to crowd to listen 
to him. 
 
Cassius Dio tells the story of Fulvia toying with the head of 
Cicero, sticking pins in his tongue (47.8.4). The story is 
doubted by Alain Gowing,45 but in reality we cannot know for 
certain, even if this may well be propaganda to blacken 
Antonius’ name. The same can of course be said of many stories 
of the period; they smack of propaganda, to use Gowing’s 
phrase.46 Therefore, we need new approaches, and one such 
would be to use comparative evidence of violence in civil war, 
even if this cannot with certainty reveal what actually happened 
during the Late Republic. With that in mind, it is important to 
emphasise that the proscriptions as well as the dismemberment 
of dead enemies were an integral part of Rome’s (civil) wars: the 
negative effect of what modern observers might consider to be 
barbaric was clearly believed by some at the time to be 
outweighed by its political efficacy. The repetition of such 
unpleasant acts during the late republican period does suggest 
this to be the case.  
Amy Richlin (1999) discusses acts of violence and the 
symbolic meaning of the body. She argues that decapitation 
might be seen ‘as the final, logical step in verbal duelling’.47 This 
is reasonable, but one should not overlook the straightforward 
answer: the simple matter of power and control. The power of 
the image supplanted that of the written word and the ‘shock 
                                                
45 1992b, 284. 
46 1992b, 288. 
47 1999, 197. Cf. Kristensen 2015, on the head of Maxentius, emphasising the 
dismemberment of the human body as an immensely effective symbolic component of 
late antique civil war. 
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effect’ ensured that the political implications would have been 
both obvious and devastating.48 This was selective violence and 
Cicero’s body was meant to be seen, talked about, and indeed 
written about. The triumvirs may have shared power in the state 
between themselves,49 but such acts implied control: the 
‘government’ often became only another faction in the civil war, 
with claims of legitimacy from all participants. In this case the 
triumvirs acted as a faction. Beyond the clear financial incentives 
for their establishment, the proscriptions were a way to gain 
control, while also eliminating opponents, thus restoring 
stability after the assassination of Caesar. Significantly, they were 
an extreme form of violence, but targeted only the alleged 
enemies of the state. Such violence displayed the resolve and 
power of the triumvirs, thus deterring potential adversaries, in 
addition to eliminating powerful enemies. Thus there was a 
logic to the triumviral violence – it was something rational. 
The question arises as to the connection between the 
proscriptions and the civil war, in particular in terms of 
justification. Dismemberment of the proscribed was a spectacle 
of violence. In terms of approaches to civil war, there is a partly 
modern confusion related to the idea that ‘Civil war often 
refuses to speak its name’.50 Lucan talks of the unspeakable war 
(1.21: bellum nefandum), albeit for little real purpose, as civil 
war is the subject of his epic De Bello Civili (unspeakable war = 
civil war: 1.324-5; cf. Valerius Flaccus, Argonautica, 3.15: 
infanda proelia [unspeakable battles]). Indeed, far from denying 
the nature of the war, mentioning the civil war as a bellum 
nefandum only serves to emphasise the conspicuous civil 
element. The proscribed themselves were, in principle at least, 
no longer citizens, although this is primarily a semantic point. 
Revoking their citizenship did, however, resolve the thorny 
                                                
48 Cf. Zimmermann 2013. This may also partly be the case today. On the power 
of violent images in the contemporary world, see Bolt 2012. The now classic study on 
the subject is Sontag 2003.  
49 Lange 2009, esp. 18-26. 
50 Kalyvas 2006, 17. 
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problem that there was in theory a law protecting the Roman 
body from corporal punishment (Lex Porcia: Cic. Rab. Perd. 
12).51 Civil war and civil war celebrations were banned in 
principle,52 but the display of Cicero’s head on the Rostra was 
apparently justifiable. The difference here is between civil war 
and foreign war, and violence itself was never an issue. In the 
Roman triumph the main procession would have concluded in 
the Forum Romanum, as the captive enemies were taken to the 
Tullianum, on occasion, for execution (Cic. Verr. 5.77; Ov. 
Pont. 2.1.41-6; Plut. Mar. 12.3-4). Visible or not, this was a 
potent way to end the most public part of the spectacle, killing 
an already defeated enemy.53  
In contrast to the standard triumphal spectacle, no civil war 
opponents were paraded through the streets of Rome in person 
in the civil war triumphs of the period – and no civil opponents 
executed at the spectacle – although at Caesar’s African triumph 
the deaths of Scipio, Petreius and Cato were depicted, albeit 
without names (App. B Civ. 2.101). This restraint reflected 
triumphal conventions. However, civil war was a clearly visible 
element in hostis declarations and the dismemberment, and 
public display, of human bodies. This was proof that the person 
in question was dead, and provided a statement of power and 
intent, and a dire warning to potential adversaries. As has been 
shown, (personal) vengeance was an integral part of the 
                                                
51 There seems to have been legislation against public violence (e.g. Lex Plautia 
and prosecutions de vi. See Cic. Cael. 70; Gruen 19922, 211-59; Lintott 19992, 107-
24, with further evidence). But this of course refers to public violence, as opposed to 
warfare. 
52 In principle no triumph could be awarded after a civil war; see Lange 2013; 
Lange 2016: apart from a few exceptions (Munda and Mutina), a general could not 
expect to triumph after a victory in an exclusively civil war, only for a civil war that 
could also be represented as a foreign war; it was by virtue of their external character 
that they qualified for a triumph. However, by the late Republic commanders could 
downplay the civil element within a triumph by merely omitting the name of their 
enemy, yet at the same time loudly claim to have ended the civil war (Naulochus and 
Actium). On civil war and triumph, see also Havener 2014; Östenberg 2014. 
53 Zimmermann emphasises that all enemies, internal and external, were subject 
to unrestricted violence (2013, 39; 245-54, on Roman massacres in war, with ancient 
evidence). 
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proscriptions, together with economic and political issues. 
Cassius Dio accurately sums up the practice of declaring people 
enemies of the state while reflecting on events after the 
assassination of Caesar (43 BCE: 46.34.5): 
 
οἱ µὲν γὰρ εὖ πράξαντες καὶ εὔβουλοι καὶ φιλοπόλιδες 
ἐνοµίσθησαν, οἱ δὲ δὴ πταίσαντες καὶ πολέµιοι τῆς πατρίδος καὶ 
ἀλιτήριοι ὠνοµάσθησαν. 
 
For those who were successful were considered shrewd and patriotic, 
while the defeated were called enemies of their country and 
accursed. 
 
‘Semantic confusion’ was thus, as mentioned, an integral part of 
civil war. The connection between civil war and hostes 
declarations became marked with the civil war between Marius 
and Sulla.54 Continuing the executions that followed the battle 
of the Colline Gate, Sulla posted the proscription list naming all 
the citizens who were declared outlaws.55 In 88 BCE Sulla had 
Marius and others declared public enemies.56 A similar fate befell 
Sulla and Cinna in 87 BCE (App. B Civ. 1.65; 73), and in 83 
BCE the senators who supported Sulla (App. B Civ. 1.86). Lists 
of proscriptions were then put up in Rome in 82 BCE, and 
Cassius Dio has a vivid description of events (fr. 109),57 
including the very prominent publication of the proscription 
lists on white boards and the displaying of the heads of the 
                                                
54 On Sulla and justification, see Vervaet 2004. On the triumvirs’ use of Sulla as 
a model, see Vervaet 2004, esp. 58. See also Cornwell in this volume. 
55 For the killings after the battle of the Colline Gate during the first Roman civil 
war, see Val. Max. 9.2.1, a section on cruelty, claiming that four legions were killed; 
Flor. 2.9.24 mentions four thousand and adds that a crime like this was to be 
expected in war; De vir. ill. 75.10 has the figure of nine thousand; see also Hinard 
1985, 41, n 106. See below. 
56 Hostes: Flor. 2.9.8; Plut. Sull. 10.1; Vell. Pat. 2.19.1. On hostis declarations, 
see Nippel 1995, esp. 66-7. The classic study is Vittinghoff 1936. 
57 On the fragments see now Urso 2013. Three fragments printed a little before 
fr. 109 by Boissevain 1895-1931, 1.349-50 = Cary 1914-27, 2.480-3 are cited as from 
Book 33, and perhaps relate to the civil war in 83 BCE, and if this is right the 
proscription fragments would probably come from the same book. This is plausible, 
but conjectural. 
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proscribed on the Rostra in the Forum.58 The leading opponents 
of Sulla could be killed with impunity (App. B Civ. 1.60). Their 
property would then have been confiscated and their houses 
destroyed.59 The heads of those executed were displayed in the 
Forum Romanum and the bodies thrown into the Tiber.60 
Marius’ body was even exhumed and the remains scattered, on 
the orders of Sulla, and the trophies commemorating his 
victories removed.61 Sulla’s triumph was for a genuinely foreign 
war, in principle unrelated to the civil war;62 however, he did use 
it to celebrate the ‘restoration’ following the civil war – the 
return of exiles and recovered monies. He did not present the 
heads in the triumph, as Constantine displayed the head of 
Maxentius in 312 CE in clear breach of triumphal 
conventions.63 But the fact that they – the heads of well-known 
Roman citizens – were on show in the Forum Romanum 
suggests that this was a civil war. The Romans were not afraid to 
admit this. As a means of justification, the enemy was presented 
as starting the war and punished accordingly. Remarkably, the 
heads on the Rostra functioned as proof, much as when the 
enemy was shown in the triumphal procession; the enemy was 
dead. 
In terms of Kalyvas’ argument, one might say with John 
Henderson that Sulla’s proscriptions occurred in the aftermath 
of battle, whereas the triumvirs began the proscriptions before 
                                                
58 Cass. Dio fr. 109: ὅτι πάντων τῶν σφαζοµένων ὁπουδὰν αἱ κεφαλαὶ ἐς τὴν 
τῶν Ῥωµαίων ἀγορὰν ἐκοµίζοντο καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ βήµατος ἐξετίθεντο, ὥσθ᾽ ὅσα περὶ 
τὰς προγραφὰς συνέβαινεν, ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ἐκείνας γίγνεσθαι (‘The heads of all 
those slaughtered in whatever place were brought to the Roman Forum and exposed 
on the Rostra, so that the same scenes were being enacted around them as around the 
proscription lists’). 
59 App. Mith. 51.204; B.Civ. 1.73. 
60 Livy Per. 77; Val. Max. 3.1.2b; Vell. Pat. 2.19.1; Sen. Prov. 3.7; Clem. 1.12.1; 
Luc. 2.160; Plut. Cat. Min. 3.2-4; App. B Civ. 1.71; Mith. 51. See Flower 2006, 92. 
61 Cic. Leg. 2.56; Val. Max. 9.2.1; Luc. 1.583-584; Hinard 1985, 80-1; and Plut. 
Caes. 6; Vell. Pat. 2.43.4; Suet. Iul. 11.2; Val. Max. 6.9.14, later restored by Caesar. 
62 Lange 2013, 73-4. 
63 See Lange 2012. 
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the actual battle of Philippi.64 This should not make us forget, 
however, the main similarity between the two, namely that the 
proscriptions in general and the dismemberment of Cicero’s 
body in particular were acts of extreme violence, typical of a civil 
war period, but with relatively few victims. These are ancient 
Roman examples of selective violence: powerful images but in 
principle less counterproductive than indiscriminate violence.65 
At Perusia, however, a very different scenario is presented by the 
evidence. 
 
The civil  war episode at Perusia 
One apparently rudimentary dictum tells us that things are 
resolved by war. According to James Whitman: ‘Wars are 
horrific ways of making decisions, but they are ways of making 
decisions.’66 He suggests that wars are fought according to some 
set of ground rules or conventions, which can limit war and its 
consequences.67 However, this is not always the case, and 
certainly not so in civil war. In the aftermath of the Perusine 
War, the logic of violence in civil war becomes apparent.68 
After Philippi, Antonius had the task of pacifying the East, 
whereas the younger Caesar had a more challenging assignment: 
the settling of veterans in Italy and the pending civil war against 
Sextus Pompeius. The relationships between the triumvirs had 
declined after Philippi. The younger Caesar took over Gaul 
                                                
64 Kalyvas 2006; Henderson 1998, 19. 
65 Cf. Tilly 2003, 14-6 on different kinds of collective violence. 
66 2012, 23. 
67 2012, 11-2, and see esp. pages 182-6 on ancient warfare. 
68 Tilly 2003, 14-5: war is defined as co-ordinated destruction, whereas the killings 
after the final battle may best resemble violent rituals, including public executions, or 
opportunism, the use of violent means to pursue generally forbidden ends, including 
looting, piracy and military pillage. Tilly also rightly emphasises that a good deal of 
collective violence occurs under the cover of law (19), even though the legality may be 
questionable. He distinguishes between force (legitimate) and violence (illegitimate) 
(27). The legal legitimacy of the Triumvirate apart (in this particular case the 
triumviral assignment, including the task to constitute the res publica [task: to end the 
civil war. See Lange 2009, 18-26]), the alleged killings at Perusia were of course 
highly problematic, as the victims were Romans, even if they made war on the res 
publica. 
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when the governor Calenus died, and there were further issues 
regarding Sextus Pompeius. Appian (B Civ. 5.61-62) even 
suggests that the triumvirs disagreed regarding what to do 
against him, perhaps because the younger Caesar was unhappy 
that Antonius had intervened in his sphere of influence.69 And 
then there was the civil war episode at Perusia.70 There is no 
denying that after the Perusine war Antonius arrived at 
Brundisium in 40 BCE and Rome was on the verge of another 
civil war, this time between the two triumvirs, although their 
soldiers refused to fight.71 The fear of civil war was always 
present. Cassius Dio emphasises the panic in Italy caused by 
land distributions after Philippi (48.3.3-6):72 
 
χρονίζοντος δ᾽ οὖν αὐτοῦ λόγοι τε παντοδαποὶ ἐθρυλοῦντο καὶ 
παθήµατα ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν παντοῖα συνέβαινε. τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα καὶ οἱ 
µὲν ὡς τέθνηκε διεθρόουν, καὶ ἡδονὴν πολλοῖς ἐνέβαλλον, οἱ δὲ 
ὡς κακόν τι βουλεύοιτο, καὶ φόβον συχνοῖς ἐνεποίουν. καὶ διὰ 
τοῦτο οἱ µὲν τὰ σφέτερα συνέκρυπτον καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἐν φυλακῇ 
ἐποιοῦντο, οἱ δὲ ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀποδράσοιντο διεσκόπουν. ἄλλοι, καὶ 
οἵ γε πλείους, οὐδὲ ἐπινοῆσαί τι ὑπὸ τοῦ σφοδροῦ δέους 
δυνάµενοι, παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς καὶ πάντως ἀπολούµενοι. βραχύ 
τέ τι καὶ κοµιδῇ σµικρὸν τὸ θαρσοῦν ἦν· ἐκ γὰρ δὴ τῆς πρόσθεν 
πολλῆς καὶ ποικίλης καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν χρηµάτων 
φθορᾶς οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐχὶ καὶ τῶν ὁµοίων καὶ τῶν χειρόνων, ἅτε καὶ 
παντελῶς κεκρατηµένοι, προσεδέχοντο. ὅθενπερ καὶ ὁ Καῖσαρ 
φοβηθεὶς µή τι ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ Λεπίδου παρόντος 
νεοχµώσωσιν, ἐπέστειλε τῇ γερουσίᾳ θαρσεῖν τε αὐτῇ παραινῶν, 
καὶ προσυπισχνούµενος πάντα καὶ πρᾴως καὶ φιλανθρώπως κατὰ 
τὸν πατέρα ποιήσειν. 
 
                                                
69 Suet. Aug. 13.3; Lange 2009, esp. 26-33. 
70 Holmes 1928, 95-100; Reinhold 1933; Syme 1939, 207-13; Gabba 1971; 
Gowing 1992a, 77-87; Osgood 2006, 159-67, 187-8; Lange 2009, 26-33, with 
evidence; on the veterans, see Brunt 1971a, 488-98. 
71 Lange 2013, 80-1; the Perusine War: Prop. 1.21-22; Livy Per. 125-126; Vell. 
Pat. 2.74.3 (cf. Levick 2010, 35, n 62); Suet. Aug. 13-4; 96.2; Plut. Ant. 30.1; App. B 
Civ. 5.32-52. 
72 On the issue of the Italian property owners, see Gabba 1971, with 
contemporary evidence from Virgil, Propertius and Horace; cf. Osgood 2006, 159, n. 
21 on Cassius Dio’s own experiences during the Severan age. 
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During this delay of Caesar’s all sorts of stories were current and all 
sorts of feelings resulted from them. For example, some spread a 
report that he was dead and caused pleasure to many people; others 
said he was planning some evil and filled numerous persons with 
fear. Therefore some proceeded to hide their property and to 
protect themselves, and others considered in what way they might 
possibly make their escape. Others, and they were the majority, 
being unable even to devise a plan by reason of their excessive fear, 
prepared to meet a certain doom. The courageous element was 
insignificant and exceedingly small; for in the light of the former 
great and manifold destruction of both lives and property they 
expected that anything whatever of a like character or worse might 
happen, inasmuch as they now had been utterly vanquished. 
Therefore Caesar, fearing that they might begin a revolt, especially 
since Lepidus was there, forwarded a letter to the senate urging its 
members to be of good cheer, and promising, further, that he would 
do everything in a mild and humane way, after the manner of his 
father. 
 
Clementia could be a powerful tool, but it would not be offered 
to all, as the war at Perusia shows. Lucius Antonius had 
demanded that the powers of the Triumvirate be returned to the 
res publica as the assassins of Caesar had been defeated.73 
According to Appian (B Civ. 5.19), Lucius was a republican (a 
highly loaded and problematic label) and ill-affected towards the 
Triumvirate. Restoring the powers of the Triumvirate was a 
recurring debate amongst the triumvirs themselves.74 Whether 
Lucius in fact can be considered a ‘republican’ or supported the 
faction of his brother Marcus is less important here. Whichever 
the case, Perusia was a civil war.75 Ventidius and Pollio, the 
lieutenants of Antonius, were repeatedly importuned by Lucius 
to march south with their legions (App. B Civ. 5.32-33), but 
even when this happened, clearly it did not change the course of 
                                                
73 Lange 2009, 22-3; cf. 27-8. 
74 Lange 2009, 24, 34-5, 52, 58-62, 70-1, 183. 
75 Suet. Aug. 9 provides us with a list of the civil wars engaged by the younger 
Caesar: Bella civilia quinque gessit: Mutinense, Philippense, Perusinum, Siculum, 
Actiacum (‘The civil wars that he waged were five, called by the names of Mutina, 
Philippi, Perusia, Sicily, and Actium’). 
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war.76 I shall not, however, focus on L. Antonius’ motivations, 
but instead focus on violence and the impact of civil war. 
There are diverse ancient traditions concerning the battle 
and its aftermath, and it is difficult to accept one and dismiss the 
others. Rather, we might also look at comparative evidence and 
modern approaches. Theories of civil war may allow us to 
reinterpret the ancient evidence. According to Gowing,77 the 
Livian tradition is different from the versions recorded by 
Appian and Cassius Dio, but Livy and Appian are in basic 
agreement that the war was brought to an end without 
bloodshed. According to Livy, Perusia was sacked, but Lucius 
and his soldiers were pardoned. The armies of both sides came 
under the command of the younger Caesar (Livy Per. 126).78 
The integration of enemy soldiers after the civil war had ended 
suggests that Livy might have focused on the positive outcome 
of the war.79 Velleius Paterculus (2.74.3-4), in a rather damning 
piece of evidence, claims that the army was cruel towards the 
inhabitants of Perusia, even if this was allegedly against the 
wishes of their commander. Velleius seems here to be the 
apologist of the younger Caesar. However, even Appian (B Civ. 
5.49) emphasises that the younger Caesar intended to turn the 
city over to his army, but that it was burned down before this 
could happen. 
The two main narratives of the conflict present different 
perspectives. Cassius Dio’s narrative is built around the 
individual protagonists, whereas Appian’s focuses on the 
populace and the consequences of civil war.80 Cassius Dio has 
                                                
76 Holmes 1928, 96-7; Reinhold 1933, 181; Syme 1939, esp. 209-11. Antonius 
needed to decide between an open break with the younger Caesar, followed no doubt 
by a civil war, and the beginning of operations against the Parthians. See Ober 2001 
for a splendid analysis of the political and military situation after the death of Caesar. 
He rightly emphasises that all might have been different had Antonius not suffered 
defeat against Parthia. 
77 1992a, 84, n. 66. 
78 Brunt 1971a, 494-6. 
79 Today scholars talk of DDR, i.e. disarmament, demobilisation, and 
reintegration after the formal end of hostilities. See Berdal and Ucko 2009. 
80 So Gowing 1992a, esp. 78. 
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Lucius and Fulvia acting independently (48.5.4; 6.4-5; contra 
48.27.1, suggesting that Antonius was informed. He did 
nothing to prevent anything, or so it seems). Contra Appian, 
who seems to suggest that Lucius acted in the interests of his 
brother (B Civ. 5.52: Appian is unsure, but cf. 5.54: the younger 
Caesar blames Antonius). Cassius Dio (48.4), echoing Antonius 
and Cleopatra, also talks of the arrogant Lucius and the 
domineering Fulvia.81 Appian (5.49-50, etc.) focuses on the 
oppressed and dispossessed and Cassius Dio on Fulvia and 
Lucius’ quest for power.82 The two traditions are in fact less 
dissimilar than is often suggested: Appian (5.48-49) and Cassius 
Dio (48.14.3-6) both imply that Lucius and his army were 
spared. Osgood concludes: ‘It is difficult to decide between the 
two versions, although many would reject the story of 
Octavian’s human sacrifice’.83 He goes on to emphasise that 
even Velleius Paterculus says that the inhabitants of Perusia were 
treated savagely.  
We may also wonder why it was so important for both 
Appian and Cassius Dio to emphasise that the inhabitants of 
Perusia were Etruscans – apart from the obvious fact that they 
were. They were Roman citizens.84 One reason may be that the 
violence was permissible because this was almost as if the enemy 
had been foreign. The argument may even have been used by 
the younger Caesar. Similarly, the civil war may have been 
justified by the younger Caesar: this was an unlawful uprising 
                                                
81 See Gowing 1992a, 79. 
82 Cass. Dio 48.4-15; 48.4 on the unmerited triumph of L. Antonius: Lucius 
claims a victory over Alpine tribes, even though he had held no command in the 
region. Fulvia’s favour in the end secured the triumph. 
83 2006, 172. 
84 A similar case may be found in the description of the Battle of the Colline 
Gate by Appian (B Civ. 1.87). According to Appian the ‘Samnites’ were the partisans 
of Marcus Lamponius (Lucanian) and Pontius Telesinus (cf. Dart 2014, 204). App. B 
Civ. 1.93: the killing of ‘Samnite’ prisoners included two Romans who were captured 
and not spared ‘even though they were Romans’. This suggests Italian insurgents 
(rightly so Dart 2014, 206). According to Dart 2014, 1 the war was technically a 
foreign war. Here we see an example of manipulating labels, providing a precursor to 
later cases of civil war. 
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against the Triumvirate and thus had to be quelled. It was 
therefore punishment for resisting the rule of Rome – that is to 
say the rule of the triumvirs and/or of the younger Caesar. Such 
rhetoric would serve in both a foreign and a civil war and 
appears the most feasible scenario. 
There are, however, also substantial differences between 
Appian and Cassius Dio. According to Appian (B Civ. 5.48–49) 
most Romans and even inhabitants of Perusia were spared, 
except the city councillors and some enemies of the younger 
Caesar, due to pressure from the younger Caesar’s soldiers. 
Lucius, the senators and knights were spared. However, as 
already mentioned, not even in this version can the younger 
Caesar be absolved entirely from blame, as he wanted to turn 
the city over to his soldiers for plunder. Contrary to this, Cassius 
Dio (48.14.3-6) reports that most inhabitants of Perusia and 
three hundred Roman knights and senators were murdered on 
the altar of the deified Caesar, including one Tiberius 
Cannutius.85 It is worth quoting Cassius Dio in some detail 
(48.14.3-5): 
 
                                                
85 Scheidel 1996 has put emphasis on problems related to the use of rounded 
numbers in Greek and Roman sources (cf. Westall 2010b). The powers of ten as well 
as multiples of thirty are very common. Scheidel concludes: ‘Exact numbers for large 
numbers are extremely rare in the written tradition. Whereas this fact might 
theoretically be due to rounding off of totals that the ancient authors nevertheless 
knew exactly, it does not appear to be such, because the figures given are normally 
chosen from a restricted menu which does not include the full ten digits, or at least 
not in an unbiased manner’ (236). As a result, the figure of three hundred, which is 
given as the number of Romans allegedly sacrificed at Mutina, might be considered a 
‘rhetorical number’. Alston 2015, 364, n. 31 (cf. 73-98 on the battle of Mutina) 
suggests that it ‘has a feel of an estimate’. The question is why? How, for example, and 
by whom, was the number of casualties on the battlefield calculated? Commanders 
would certainly not have underestimated the extent of their victories. However, in a 
civil war this might be reversed. Having said that, after victories commanders will have 
mentioned these figures in the laurelled letters sent back to the Senate and then later 
in the Senate meeting, deciding on their request for a triumph (Lange 2016). 
Depending on where the number three hundred derives from, it may thus be too 
small or too high. Whichever the case, the exact number may after all be of lesser 
importance. 
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πολλὰ µὲν πρὸς τούτους ὡς ἑκάστους, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῖς 
τείχεσιν ἐπράχθη, µέχρις οὗ καίτοι πλεονεκτοῦντες τὰ πλείω οἱ 
περὶ τὸν Λούκιον ὅµως ὑπὸ λιµοῦ ἑάλωσαν. καὶ αὐτὸς µὲν ἄλλοι 
τέ τινες ἄδειαν εὕροντο, οἱ δὲ δὴ πλείους τῶν τε βουλευτῶν καὶ 
τῶν ἱππέων ἐφθάρησαν. καὶ λόγος γε ἔχει ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἁπλῶς τοῦτο 
ἔπαθον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸν βωµὸν τὸν τῷ Καίσαρι τῷ προτέρῳ 
ὡσιωµένον ἀχθέντες ἱππῆς τε τριακόσιοι καὶ βουλευταὶ ἄλλοι τε 
καὶ ὁ Καννούτιος ὁ Τιβέριος, ὅς ποτε ἐν τῇ δηµαρχίᾳ τὸ πλῆθος 
τῷ Καίσαρι τῷ Ὀκταουιανῷ ἤθροισεν, ἐτύθησαν. τῶν δὲ 
Περουσίνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐκεῖ ἁλόντων οἱ πλείους 
ἀπώλοντο, καὶ ἡ πόλις αὐτή, πλὴν τοῦ Ἡφαιστείου τοῦ τε τῆς 
Ἥρας ἕδους, πᾶσα κατεκαύθη. 
 
Many attacks were made upon these reinforcements separately and 
many engagements were fought close to the walls, until the 
followers of Lucius, even though they were generally successful, 
nevertheless were forced by hunger to capitulate. The leader and 
some others obtained pardon, but most of the senators and knights 
were put to death. And the story goes that they did not merely 
suffer death in an ordinary form, but were led to the altar 
consecrated to the former Caesar and were there sacrificed — three 
hundred knights and many senators, among them Tiberius 
Cannutius, who previously during his tribuneship had assembled 
the populace for Octavian. Of the people of Perusia and the others 
who were captured there the majority lost their lives, and the city 
itself, except the temple of Vulcan and the statue of Juno, was 
entirely destroyed by fire. 
 
It is not my intention to reopen the question of whether human 
sacrifices were incompatible with Roman religiosity, as this has 
recently been addressed by Gradel (2002). Instead, I want to add 
that in the case of Perusia the alleged human sacrifices should be 
approached mainly as a question of politics and war, not 
religion, even if the two are always intertwined.86 Significantly, 
whatever Roman religion teaches us, this does not prove that the 
killings at Perusia never happened. Furthermore, rejecting the 
report that three hundred senators and knights were killed after 
Perusia is very different from being sceptical that it happened at 
                                                
86 Murray 2006, 87: ‘History does suggest a number of things about war. The 
first is that it is always about politics’. 
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the Altar to the Divine Julius. This last part may seem an 
exaggeration, even slanderous – but even here we cannot be 
sure.87 The altar is of course highly significant, referring to the 
convention that to harm someone who had taken refuge at an 
altar was sacrilege (asylum, similar to the Thucydides story 
(3.81.5), see above). Cassius Dio’s account is supported in the 
parallel evidence of Suetonius (Aug. 13, 15) and Seneca, who 
emphasises the difference between the Triumvirate and the 
Principate, the younger Caesar and Augustus in De Clementia 
(1.11.1): 
 
fuerit moderatus et clemens, nempe post mare Actiacum Romano 
cruore infectum, nempe post fractas in Sicilia classes et suas et 
alienas, nempe post Perusinas aras et proscriptiones. 
 
Granted he was restrained and merciful – to be sure, after the sea at 
Actium had been stained by Roman blood, after his own and others’ 
fleets had been wrecked in Sicily, after the altars of Perusia and the 
proscriptions. 
 
In light of the aftermath of the final battle of the Perusine War, 
Cassius Dio appears to belong to a tradition hostile to the 
younger Caesar. Gowing emphasises: ‘This, however, is precisely 
the type of behaviour Cassius Dio abhorred in his own emperors 
and it is not uncharacteristic that he should include the story in 
his account’.88 Velleius Paterculus puts everything into 
perspective, suggesting that the younger Caesar’s cruelty after 
Philippi was untypical and thus mainly owing to the brutality of 
his fellow triumvirs (2.86.2). This is significant, as it suggests 
that acts of cruelty did occur.89 Syme was right when he 
                                                
87 Cf. Zimmermann 2013, 303. The question remains: was there a cult to the 
Divine Julius at Perusia at this point in time? 
88 1992a, 84. 
89 A speech by Septimius Severus after his victory over Clodius Albinus in 197 
CE, as reported by Cassius Dio 76[75].8.1-4 (cf. SHA, Sev. 12.7-9), praised the 
cruelty of Sulla, Marius and Augustus against their enemies in the civil wars. See, 
however, Cassius Dio 56.38.1-5. 
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remarked that ‘[t]he captives were a problem’,90 although this 
hardly explains what happened at Perusia. Pelling emphasises 
that Lucius Antonius and his soldiers were spared, the 
inhabitants of Perusia not. He adds: ‘Octavian’s enemies soon 
elaborated the story, with talk of human sacrifice of 300 senators 
and knights at the altar of Divus Iulius; but the unembroidered 
truth was horrifying enough’.91 Both Kienast and Eck seem to 
accept that the three hundred senators and knights were killed 
by the younger Caesar.92 Cooley emphasises that contrary to 
mercy, the younger Caesar ‘reputedly displayed immoderate 
cruelty after the victories at Philippi and Perusia’.93 Nevertheless, 
according to Rich, Cassius Dio’s portrayal of the early career of 
the younger Caesar is not hostile.94 He was seeking monarchy 
and thus acted in the best interest of Rome. Cassius Dio wrote 
in the realist tradition of Thucydides (see 52.2.6-7), and his 
views on the civil war period are thus unlikely to be the result of 
a switch in sources. The disagreement among these scholars 
reveals the problematic nature of the evidence, and the challenge 
is finding a way to approach it. 
Certain comparative examples are worthy of mention: M. 
Marius Gratidanus was slaughtered at the tomb of Q. Lutatius 
Catulus in 82 BCE; Cicero claimed that the Catilinarians 
wanted to kill him at the tomb of Catilina (Pis. 16); and after 
the triumph of Caesar in 46 BCE, rioting soldiers were executed 
and their heads set up at the Regia (Cass. Dio 43.24.3).95 These 
stories represent differing forms of violence, some selective, 
others indiscriminate. Where does this leave us? When we draw 
                                                
90 1939, 212. 
91 1996, 16. Cf. Levick 2010, 35 also suggests initial display of clemency 
followed by ‘extraordinarily brutal treatment of the inhabitants (even if it has been 
exaggerated)’; cf. 2010, 231: Perusia as an understandable absentee from the Res 
Gestae (see below). 
92 Kienast 19993, 45; Eck 1998, 22. 
93 2009, 117-8; cf. Ridley 2003, 169-71, referring back to Res Gestae 3.1, where 
Augustus claims to have saved citizens who begged pardon. 
94 1990, 13-8, esp. 14. 
95 Weinstock 1971, 398-9 for more examples. 
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on both the ancient sources and modern empirical evidence and 
theoretical approaches, a picture emerges: Perusia was an 
example of indiscriminate violence, possibly resulting from the 
younger Caesar’s lack of control at this time in Italy. The 
inhabitants of Perusia themselves were unfortunate victims of 
circumstance, whereas the younger Caesar’s other enemies had 
fought him and were defeated there. The victims were thus all 
the enemies present, and in contrast to the proscriptions there 
does not appear to have been any prior intent. 
One issue that has attracted a fair share of scholarly attention 
is the absence of Perusia from the Res Gestae.96 Indeed, neither 
Perusia nor the proscriptions are mentioned, although it should 
be added that even Agrippa only appears twice. Osgood claims 
that ‘[w]hen at the end of his life Octavian looked back to his 
early career he could find ways to represent every campaign of 
the civil war in a positive light except Perusia’.97 He adds that 
Augustus could not later blame his opponent Antonius for this 
incident. It is clearly not omitted because it was a civil war, as 
civil war, including the phrase bellum civile, is prominently 
mentioned in chapters 1-3 and 34. Therefore one must ask what 
it was about the events at Perusia that caused their omission. 
Perhaps it was the uncomfortable fact that the younger Caesar 
fought the Italian landowners, or maybe there were further 
complications. As with the assassins of Caesar (RGDA 2), the 
younger Caesar would undoubtedly have claimed that his 
opponents, Lucius Antonius and Fulvia, were making war on 
the res publica.98 
                                                
96 Lange 2009, 28: ‘The Perusine War is not mentioned in the Res Gestae, but 
not much between Philippi and Actium is, although Naulochus is not forgotten 
(RGDA 25.1)’; Syme 1939, 523: ‘The Record is no less instructive for what it omits 
than for what it says’; Ridley 2003, 76 (‘In this chapter [2] one might most naturally 
expect mention of the Perusine War’. 
97 2006, 182. 
98 L. Antonius and hostis declaration: Florus 2.16 (probably deriving his 
information from Livy); Livy Per. 125, emphasising that Lucius started the war, 
attacking the younger Caesar. 
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Any overall conclusion is hampered by the problematic 
nature of the evidence. However, should we accept the details 
describing the slaughter of three hundred senators and knights, 
as well as that of the inhabitants of Perusia – all prisoners of war 
– then this is an extreme example of indiscriminate violence. 
Moreover, it suggests that the younger Caesar was not in control 
of Italy after Philippi. The killings are driven by personal 
animosities – the younger Caesar would have known many or at 
least some of these people personally when he determined to 
punish them, and thus suppress a dangerous uprising in Italy, 
one perhaps even supported by his fellow triumvir Antonius. 
Such a lack of control also suggests that this was an ineffective 
form of violence, maybe even counterproductive (and seemingly 
the wrong decision to take, even though the younger Caesar was 
trying to get on top of the Italian situation), as implied by the 
ancient critique. In the period from Perusia to Brundisium, 
where the soldiers helped to reconcile the rival triumvirs, the 
younger Caesar was on the defensive. He faced mounting 
problems in Italy with his soldiers, and with Lucius Antonius, 
Fulvia, and Sextus Pompeius; he feared a potential alliance 
between Sextus Pompeius and Antonius.99 We must remember, 
of course, that the killings of defeated enemies after battle are a 
common feature in Roman history (Polyb. 10.15.4-6).100 This 
more than anything may suggest that civil war in part came to 
be perceived in the same way as foreign wars. 
 
Conclusions 
There is little reason to claim that contemporary civil wars are 
identical to those in the ancient world. However, certain 
                                                
99 Berdowski 2011, 33-4; App. B Civ. 5.56-7. In the end a deal, which soon 
broke down, was struck between the triumvirs and Sextus Pompeius at Mutina in 39 
BCE – due to the isolated nature of his base at Sicily, Sextus Pompeius was able to 
equip a large battle fleet, raiding the Italian coast and disturbing Rome’s grain ships. 
All participants acted opportunistically and the Misenum Treaty was cynical in as 
much as it was a necessary deal for all parties. In the end the younger Caesar defeated 
Sextus Pompeius in 36 BCE. For an altogether different take on this, see Welch 2012. 
100 Cf. Zimmermann 2013, 247 with more evidence. 
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parallels occur, especially in terms of the logic of violence. 
Thucydides’ account of civil war, for example, could well 
describe a modern conflict (3.82.4):  
 
καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνοµάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν 
τῇ δικαιώσει. τόλµα µὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος 
ἐνοµίσθη, µέλλησις δὲ προµηθὴς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον 
τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχηµα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν 
ἀργόν: τὸ δ᾽ ἐµπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνδρὸς µοίρᾳ προσετέθη, ἀσφαλείᾳ 
δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὔλογος. 
 
Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which 
was given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the 
courage of a loyal supporter; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; 
moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all 
sides of a question incapacity to act on any. Frantic violence became 
the attribution of manliness; cautious plotting a justifiable means of 
self-defence. 
 
The result of civil war is fragmentation and the justifications 
presented by the various warring parties have led to semantic 
confusion. The proscriptions and the mutilation of the body of 
Cicero can be explained as a matter of ‘selective violence’ against 
enemy factions or personal enemies. The triumvirs’ unchecked 
power ensured that the punishment of personal enemies was all 
but inevitable, especially in light of their driving ambition. The 
spectacle of the dismembered bodies on the Rostra, built on the 
precedent set by Sulla, clearly suggests premeditated action. 
Later during the civil war period the younger Caesar found his 
control of Italy uncertain and under threat. This does not of 
itself prove that the massacre took place, but comparative 
evidence suggests that the ‘indiscriminate’ violence at Perusia, 
including the sacking of the city, corresponds to the 
circumstances the younger Caesar faced.101 The evidence of 
more recent conflicts suggests that we certainly cannot rule out 
                                                
101 It should of course be remembered that violent appropriation, including 
acquisition of booty, was an intrinsic part of warfare in ancient times. See Gabrielsen 
2013, esp. 147. However, the difference was that this was a civil war and the enemies 
Roman citizens. 
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the killing of the three hundred. Both instances of violence, 
against Cicero and Perusia, are compatible with modern theory 
and empirical evidence (esp. Kalyvas 2006; Martin 2014), and 
also with Thucydides’ ‘Idealtypus’. There was a logic of violence 
during the civil war of the Late Republic. 
Ending a civil war was never just about victory on the 
battlefield – some of the most significant and interesting acts of 
violence in civil war take place elsewhere or subsequent to the 
‘end’ of the battle proper – but also the victor’s justification and 
the facilitation of peace.102 Not only is war a distinct and 
recurring part of human nature, but the means of justifying 
(civil) wars also reveal similar tendencies over time. That 
Augustus late in life chose to downplay his role in the 
proscriptions and the sacking at Perusia, including the alleged 
killings of the three hundred, is hardly surprising: as an 
inscription justifying and celebrating his achievements, the Res 
Gestae would never focus on negative qualities or actions.103 The 
civil war is mentioned in the inscription, but the process of the 
extinction of the civil war is emphasised (RGDA 34.1: in 
consulatu sexto et septimo, postqua[m b]el[la ciuil]ia exstinxeram). 
The dismemberment of Cicero’s body served as a deterrent and 
statement of authority – the financial incentives of the 
proscriptions alone cannot explain such a spectacle. The Perusia 
killings not only had the same function, but were also a 
consequence of the lack of control and challenge to the power of 
the younger Caesar.104 As such, these acts were not merely the 
result of what might be called natural aggression. This is also 
why the Res Gestae focuses on the positive outcome of the civil 
war: peace after war, a civil war instigated by others.105 Augustus 
did in fact claim (esp. RGDA 2 and 3) that violence was 
                                                
102 On triumph and closure, see Westall 2014. On ending civil war at Rome, see 
Osgood 2015. 
103 Cf. Lange 2008. 
104 Tac. Hist. 1.50.2 accordingly includes Perusia in a list (Pharsaliam Philippos et 
Perusiam ac Mutinam) of great national disasters: nota publicarum cladium nomina. 
105 Cf. Lange 2009. 
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necessary to establish peace and order. An enemy should in 
principle always be foreign and, accordingly, a civil war was a 
war without a real enemy. In the case of Rome a foreign enemy 
thus had to be created, either by turning civil wars partly into 
foreign wars106 or by turning Romans into enemies of the state. 
Both approaches did, however, still conspicuously emphasise 
civil war. The proscriptions and the killings at Perusia were 
personally motivated and reveal much about power struggles and 
civil war.107 Violence, both selective and indiscriminate, is a 
conspicuous part of civil war, modern as well as ancient, and 
there is a distinct logic to it: the elimination of personal enemies 
and the securing of power.  
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106 See Lange 2013. 
107 See Christia 2012, using Realist Theory on civil war: factions in the civil wars 
of Rome were actors in their own right and with their own interests, trying to side 
with the winner, or alternatively, trying to obtain a political solution. In Rome, as in 
contemporary civil war, there was no such thing as an impossible alliance. The 
primary aim of warring groups in civil war was that of self-preservation. 
